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BOOK REVIEW

RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT.l Edited by Sanford Levinson.z Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press.
$59.50; paper, $18.95.

1995. Pp. ix, 330.

Cloth,

Eric Grant3

In this collection of essays, Sanford Levinson has brought
together an impressive group of constitutional theorists and
political scientists to discuss the theory and practice of amending
constitutions. Nine of the volume's thirteen contributions are
original, and even the four previously published works are useful
abridgements of valuable scholarship.4 In the following pages, I
will discuss in detail a group of four essays that consider whether
the United States Constitution may legitimately be amended
outside of Article v.s Before doing that, however, I will briefly
1. This volume consists of the following essays: Sanford Levinson, Introduction:
Imperfection and Amendability; Sanford Levinson, How Many Tunes Has the United
States Constitution Been Amended? (A) < 26; (B) 26; (C) 27; (D) > 27: Accounting for
Constitutional Change; Stephen M. Griffin, Constitutionalism in the United States: From
Theory to Politics; Bruce Ackerman, Higher Lawmaking; Akhil Reed Amar, Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional Amendmenr, David R. Dow, The Plain Meaning of Article V;
Frederick Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions of a Constitution; Walter F. Murphy,
Merlin's Memory: The Past and Future Imperfect of the Once and Future Polity; John R.
Vile, The Case against Implicit Limits on the Constitutional Amending Process; Mark E.
Brandon, The "Original" Thineenth Amendment and the Limits to Formal Constitutional
Change; Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendmenr, Stephen Holmes
and Cass R. Sunstein, The Politics of Constitutional Revision in Eastern Europe; Noam J.
Zohar, Midrash: Amendment through the Molding of Meaning; Appendix: Amending Provisions of Selected New Constitutions in Eastern Europe. See pp. vii-viii.
2. W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood Jr. Regents Chair in Law, University of Texas.
3. Associate, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Washington, D.C.
4. The essays by Professors Levinson, Amar, Dow, and Vile in Chapters Two, Rve,
Six, and Nine, respectively, are based on previous works. See pp. 13, 89, 117, 191.
5. Article V provides:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary,
shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the
Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for pro-
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summarize the remaining essays in the hope of whetting your appetite for the entire volume.
In his introductory essay, Levinson puts forward "the distinction between what might be termed 'ordinary' change within
a legal system that is the result of standard-form interpretation of
the relevant materials within that system and a special kind of
change that we call 'amendment'" (p. 7), which he describes
loosely as "a genuine change not immanent within the preexisting materials" (p. 21). Subsequent essays by Levinson and Stephen M. Griffin draw on this distinction to consider whether the
United States Constitution has been "amended" apart from what
Levinson calls the "explicit textual additions" (p. 25) that begin
with "Amendment I" and end with "Amendment XXVII." In
other words, they consider, as a historical matter, whether Article V has served as the exclusive method of bringing about constitutional amendment. One can guess what the answer is, and
Griffin obligingly puts it bluntly: "The crucial constitutional fact
of the twentieth century is that all significant change in the structure of the national government after the New Deal occurred
through non-Article V means" (p. 51).
Three essays by Walter F. Murphy, John R. Vile, and Mark
E. Brandon address another kind of exclusivity-the exclusivity
of Article V's restrictions on the substance of amendments. Recall that Article V explicitly prohibits any amendment that would
authorize Congress to ban the importation of slaves prior to 1808
or would deprive states of equal suffrage in the Senate without
their consent. As Vile notes, these "two entrenchment clauses
... lead logically to the question of whether there are any implicit
limits on the constitutional amending process" (p. 191, emphasis
added). Vile himself makes the case against such limits, responding to arguments by (among others) Murphy, who contributes a
contrary answer. Brandon usefully surveys the various approaches to implicit limits by asking how each would treat the
posing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three
fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the
one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand
eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in
the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent,
.
shall be deprived of it's [sic] equal Suffrage in the Senate.
As Levinson notes in his introductory essay, the "internal" structure of Arttcle V
raises a number of fascinating questions regarding ratification, constitutional conventions,
etc. See generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional Lessons of the Twenty-seventh Amendment, 103 Yale L.J. 677 (1993). These questions are not addressed in Responding to Imperfection.
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Corwin Amendment, an 1861 proposal that intended to perpetuate slavery by amending Article V to preclude the adoption of
any subsequent amendments authorizing Congress to abolish or
interfere with the "domestic institutions" of the states.6
The final three essays in Responding to Imperfection might
be described as "comparative" analyses of the amending process.
Donald S. Lutz presents a fascinating empirical study of the formal amendment of state and foreign constitutions.7 Stephen
Holmes and Cass R. Sunstein analyze the politics of constitutional revision in Eastern Europe. For the new democracies
emerging from Communist tyranny, they prescribe a regime that
"sets relatively lax conditions for amendment, keeps unamendable provisions to a minimal core of basic rights and institutions,
and usually allows the process to be monopolized by parliament,
without any obligatory recourse to popular referenda" (p. 275).
Finally, Noam J. Zohar considers the problems of interpretation
and amendment in the context of Jewish law (the Halakha). He
poses the provocative question, "How can anyone purport to
'amend' divine revelation?" (p. 307). His essay describes how
the sages of classical Judaism conceived of a vehicle (Midrash) to
do so. The result: "The text is eternally fixed; but its meaning is
ultimately fluid" (p. 318). Midrash thus appears to illustrate one
of Lutz's empirical propositions: "[a] relatively difficult [formal]
amendment process will tend to be associated with a broad theory of judicial construction" (p. 273).
I have canvassed the foregoing essays in order to give some
flavor of the variety of analyses presented in this volume. I want
to tum now to the remaining four essays, contributed by Bruce
Ackerman, Akhil Reed Amar, David R. Dow, and Frederick
6. The lame-duck Thirty-Sixth Congress, already lacking Senators and Representatives from the seven Deep South states that had seceded, proposed the Corwin Amendment to the states on March 2, 1861. President Lincoln gave his support to the
amendment in his First Inaugural Address; indeed, Lincoln personally signed the joint
resolution, the only President to do so. Just three states ratified the Corwin Amendment,
which in any event became moot upon ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865.
See pp. 218-19.
7. Lutz's essay is excellent in all respects but one. Arguing that "the U.S. Constitution is unusually, and probably excessively, difficult to amend," Lutz suggests that we
should (among other alternatives) "reduce the number of states required for amendment
ratification to two-thirds (from three-fourths), which would ... roughly triple the amendment rate" (p. 265). This is a historically testable hypothesis, and it tests false: only six
amendments have been submitted to the states but not ratified by the necessary threefourths. See 1-6 U.S.C. lxviii-lxix (1994). At least two of the proposed amendments-the
Corwin Amendment discussed in note 6 above and the Child Labor Amendment-failed
to gamer ratification by even two-thirds of the states. At most, therefore, only four additional amendments conceivably would have been ratified under Lutz's proposed rule, a
far cry from the 54 predicted by his hypothesis.
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Schauer. Each looks at Article V from a theoretical perspective:
as a legal matter, does (should) Article V constitute the exclusive
mechanism for amending the United States Constitution?
I
It is useful to begin with Schauer's contribution in Chapter
Seven, because it illuminates the debate and provides an insightful framework for analyzing Responding to Imperfection's
three other answers to this question. In "Amending the Presuppositions of a Constitution," Schauer observes that "most existing treatments of the process of constitutional amendment ...
are internal to the constitution itself. They take a constitution's
own provisions ... as the sole source of legitimate amendment"
(p. 146). Applying such "internalist" analysis to the United
States Constitution, Schauer makes short work of ascertaining
the legitimate methods of amendment: "the Constitution is most
easily read as implying that its own specified conditions for valid
amendment are to be treated as exclusive" (p. 146). Thus, while
acknowledging that these conditions for amendment do not specify their own exclusivity, Schauer believes that "any fair literal
reading of the text of Article V produces the conclusion that
nothing in the Constitution textually authorizes methods of
amendment other than the two alternative procedures established in Article V itself" (pp. 146-47).
In this conclusion, Schauer joins the Article V "exclusivists,"
who are represented in Responding to Imperfection by David R.
Dow's contribution in Chapter Six, "The Plain Meaning of Article V."s Opposed to them are the "nonexclusivists," who (in
Schauer's words) undertake "heroic efforts to explain either how
other provisions of the Constitution might also allow amendment
in different ways, or how different readings of Article V itself
might suggest a broader conception of what it takes to amend the
Constitution" (p. 147). The (in}famous theses of Bruce Ackerman and Akhil Reed Amar represent this camp in Chapters Four
and Five, respectively.9
8. Dow states that his essay is a substantially abridged (and slightly revised) version of his article, When Words Mean What We Believe They Say: The Case of Article V, 16
Iowa L. Rev. 1 (1990). P. 117. See generally infra Part II.
9. Ackerman states that his essay will serve, in modified form, as the first chapter
his forthcoming book, We the People: Transformations (Harv. U. Press, 1996). P. 69 n.3.
This continues a project that includes The Stom Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93
Yale L.J. 1013 (1984); Constitutional Politics!Constilutional Law, 99 Yale LJ. 453 (1989);
and We the People: Foundations (Harv. U. Press, 1991). See generally infra Part III.
Amar states that his essay is a highly abridged version of a lecture he published as
The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Anicle V, 94 Colum. L.
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But notwithstanding his own exclusivist leanings, Schauer is
not concerned to settle the dispute between the exclusivists and
the nonexclusivists. Rather, he dismisses the disputants' shared
premise that "the internal resources of the Constitution ... provide the only or most appropriate way of thinking about the process of constitutional change" (p. 147). Arguing instead for an
"external" focus, Schauer concludes that "constitutions can and
do change not only when they are amended according to their
own provisions or their own history ... , but whenever there is a
change in [their] underlying presuppositions-political and social, but decidedly not constitutional or legal" (p. 148).
Schauer reaches this conclusion in a somewhat roundabout
way. First, he asks us to consider what it is that makes a constitution "valid." Upon reflection, one must agree with Schauer that
nothing in a constitution can give that constitution validity-that
is, a constitution cannot supply its own grounding.10 Schauer argues that "constitutions rest on logically antecedent presuppositions that give them their constitutional status" (pp. 147-48).
These presuppositions, which are political and social, make up
what Schauer calls the "ultimate rule of recognition" (borrowing
from H.L.A. Hart), or more succinctly, the "Grundnorm" (borrowing from Hans Kelsen).ll To determine the validity of a conRev. 457 (1994). P. 89. This amplified his earlier work, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending
the Constitution Outside Anicle V, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1043 (1988). See generally infra
Part IV.
Ackerman and Amar together form "what might be called the "Yale school" of constitutional interpretation': that the Constitution may be amended by means other than the
cumbersome and constraining procedures set out in Article V." Charles Fried, The
Supreme Court, 1994 Term-Foreword: Revolutions?, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 13, 28 (1995)
(footnote omitted) (quoting Laurence H. nibe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1221,
1246 (1995)). Citing Responding to Imperfection by name, Justice Fried discusses many of
the same issues considered herein. See id. at 24 n.61, 24-33.
10. Schauer humorously illustrates this point by offering a self-framed document
entitled, "The Constitution of the United States of America." In six brief "Articles,"
Schauer's United States Constitution grants all legislative, executive, and judicial powers
over the territory of the United States to Schauer himself or to his appointees. Article VI
of Schauer's United States Constitution, like Article VII of the "real" United States Constitution, specifies the conditions for its establishment: "This Constitution shall be established and in force upon signing by the individual named in Article I [i.e., Frederick
Schauer]." As one might expect, the document does bear Schauer's signature.
Is Schauer's self-described "silly collection of words" the Constitution of the United
States, to the exclusion of the document found in the National Archives? If it is not,
Schauer argues, "[w]e know this not because of anything internal to one document or the
other, because internally they are equally valid." Rather, as explained in the text, our
certainty that Schauer's document lacks any pretense to validity is based on "what we
know empirically and factually about the world." See pp. 152-53.
11. Schauer draws mainly on H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Press,
1961), especially pp. 97-114, 245-47, and Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State
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stitution, then, one should measure it against a society's
Grundnorm.
Although Schauer is less than precise in defining and explaining his concepts, one can infer the following from his essay:
The Grundnorm is the set of "ultimate" legal norms by which all
other sources of law in a society are judged as valid or not; its
own "legal" validity is presupposed or hypothesized.12 The existence and content of the Grundnorm "is a matter of social fact,
and so determining it is for empirical investigation rather than
legal analysis" (p. 150). Such investigation most fruitfully focuses
on "practice"-whether or not a particular norm has been accepted by the people, by their officials, and by judges in particular. Consider, for example, the dilemma that arises when a
revolutionary movement attempts to substitute a new constitution for an old one: one might ask, which constitution is the valid
one? Yet this, says Schauer, "is a question that the internal resources of neither the old nor the new constitutions can answer."
Rather, "[t]he fact of constitutional displacement is just that-a
fact," because the choice between the two constitutions is a "social choice," not a legal one (p. 154).
Complete substitution of a later constitution for an earlier
one, or "total constitutional displacement," frames the preceding
question in its starkest form. Schauer argues, however, that "the
essential point about the externality (to a constitution) of the determination of constitutional change applies equally to partial
displacement" (p. 155).13 Thus, "the constitution" according to
the Grundnorm need not be something written at one time, for a
written constitution can be partially displaced by changes in the
(unwritten) Grundnorm. Schauer then takes the final step: "If
partial displacement can take place outside of the 'primary' written constitution, then so too can partial 'supplementation' take
place outside of the written constitution" (p. 156). In countries
(Anders Wedburg trans.) (Russell & Russell, 1961), especially pp. 115-36. While borrowing their tenns, Schauer self-consciously departs from the analyses of Hart and Kelsen in
significant respects. See pp. 149-51, 155-56.
12. Schauer concedes that "we might still use the word valid to refer to some [nonlegal) norm system, such as a moral one" (p. 150).
13. Schauer posits the example of a country divided between the partisans of Constitution A (containing structure of government provisions in part A.1 and a bill of rights
in part A.2) and the partisans of Constitution B (comprising analogous parts B.l and B.2).
If the struggling forces were to agree, with widespread public support, that the country
should henceforth be governed by a combination of the constitutions, namely, part A.1
together with part B.2, "the content of the ultimate rule of recognition would be such that
it then recognized as the supreme Jaw this combination of A.1 and B.2." Accordingly,
"the correct answer to the question 'What is the constitution?' would be 'the combination
of A.l and B.2.' " See p. 155.
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that have a single document called "the Constitution," observes
Schauer, the Grundnorm is more-or-less built around that document but is not necessarily congruent with it. The Grundnorm of
the United States, for example, most likely "refuse[s] to recognize parts of the written Constitution of 1787 as valid law, and
most certainly recognizes as valid law sources of law not traceable to or through the Constitution of 1787 ."14
In Schauer's view, therefore, it is "necessarily the case that
constitutions [here he uses the word loosely to mean ultimate
rules] are always subject to amendment by changes-amendments-in the practices of a citizenry, in the practices of its officials, and in the practices of its judges" (p. 161). If this is true,
.whether the supermajoritarian process set forth in Article V constitutes the exclusive mechanism for amending the document in
the National Archives called the United States Constitution is
not an interesting question. We should ask instead whether that
supermajoritarian process constitutes the exclusive mechanism
for amending the United States Grundnorm. And this latter
question, says Schauer, "will be a question of social and political
fact and not a question of law, constitutional or otherwise" (p.
161).
II

I would like now to consider the three related contributions
to Responding to Imperfection in light of Schauer's construct.
Beginning with the proposition that Article V "is an example of
... [a] text the meaning of which is essentially clear" (p. 117),
David Dow advances the exclusivist thesis that "the mechanism
outlined in Article V clearly and unequivocally sets out an exclusive mode of constitutional amendment" (p. 118). Some of
14. P. 156 (citing Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85
Mich. L. Rev. 621 (1987)). Schauer hints that the Second Amendment is one part of our
written Constitution no longer recognized as valid. See p. 157. I would nominate the
Contracts Clause. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (forbidding states to "pass any ... Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts"); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S.
398 (1934).
In his introductory essay, Levinson suggests that the following legal norm is recognized as valid despite its absence from (and necessary conflict with) the Constitution of
1787: "Congress may pass any regulation it believes conducive to the national health,
safety, or welfare so long as the conduct regulated has any link whatsoever with 'interstate commerce' " (pp. 7-8). Since Levinson's suggestion, however, the Supreme Court
has decided United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), which struck down, as beyond
the enumerated powers of Congress, a statute criminalizing the possession of firearms
within 1000 feet of a school.
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Dow's arguments are textual; others are originalist.ls But Dow
has an additional kind of argument, one that Schauer would find
interesting.
Dow begins with the following empirical observations: "In
the United States, we believe in, and our political institutions reflect, majority rule. At the same time, we also believe [and presumably our political institutions also reflect the fact] that not
everything ought to be subject to [majority rule]" (p. 119). From
these facts Dow infers that "our American political commitment
to majoritarianism is ... qualified and not absolute." Thus, he
asks rhetorically:
Do we not believe that we can agree today to bind ourselves
tomorrow, and, further, that we can agree today that we shall
not have the right tomorrow to change our minds? Do we not
agree that a majority can (i.e., it has the authority to) agree
today that it will take more than a mere majority tomorrow to
interfere with [certain rights]? ... Indeed, we believe in each
of these propositions, for these make up what our Constitution
is (p. 122).

Based on these empirical observations, Dow concludes that quite
apart from arguments based on text or intent, "Article V must be
understood to negative other conceivable [that is, majoritarian]
modes of amendment" if the Constitution is to reflect accurately
our belief that individual rights must be protected against encroachment by majorities (p. 127, emphasis added).
This strand of Dow's argument echoes Schauer's
Grundnorm concept. To the extent that Dow's "beliefs" are reflected in our political institutions-and Dow claims they arethey correspond (if loosely) to Schauer's "practices." For Dow,
then, the American Grundnorm treats the supermajoritarian
mechanisms of Article V as exclusive. As explained above,
Schauer's analysis demands that such a proposition be established not as a matter of law, but as a matter of social and polit15. The textual argument is simply the following: "Interpretation cannot proceed
without accepted hermeneutical techniques. In American law, both statutory as well as
constitutional, one such basic rule is the principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius: The
expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." That is, Article V expresses two
supermajoritarian mode of constitutional amendment; therefore, all other modes (especially majoritarian ones) are excluded. Although the title of his essay refers merely to the
"plain meaning" of Article V, Dow needs an originalist backup, given his concession that
"the applicability of [the expressio unius] maxim of interpre~tion depends UP:<Jn the intentions of the parties who drafted the document." He accordmgly endeavors, m conventional and solid fashion, to demonstrate that "the Framers must be understood to have
intended Article V to be exclusive." See p. 127.
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ical fact. Dow himself explicitly acknowledges the empirical
underpinnings of his conclusions:
When I say "we believe in," as I do throughout this essay,
I am making an empirical assumption concerning the ideas
that are prevalent in our culture: concerning, more specifically,
the ideas that define our culture, that are its essence rather
than merely its attributes. Insofar as these empirical assumptions are flawed or erroneous, my argument suffers accordingly (p. 119 n.8).

Given Dow's own admission that a particular empirical reality-the fact that "our commitment to majoritarianism is severely circumscribed" (p. 121)-undergirds his entire enterprise,
one would expect him to justify his empirical assumptions. But
Dow does not, either by his own research or by reference to the
scholarship of others.16 This lack of evidence is especially suspect, because he does not hesitate to muster facts in other contexts, as when he is attempting to refute Bruce Ackerman's
historical arguments.17 Verification of the Grundnorm posited
by Dow will have to wait for another day.

III
The Grundnorm concept can also illuminate Ackerman's
theory of "Higher Lawmaking." In brief, Ackerman argues that
modern Americans should not "read Article V as if it described
the only mechanisms they may appropriately use for constitutional revision at the dawn of the twenty-first century" (p. 72).
Rather, "constitutional authority to speak in the voice of We the
People" may be obtained by "decisive electoral victories" (p. 81)
that grant the victors power successfully to displace the constitutional vision of any dissenting institutions. In modern times,
these victories enable an activist President self-consciously to
16. Indeed, Dow's only empirical reference in this regard is a statement about Jewish law, as explicated by the talmudic rabbis. Seep. 121 & nn.20-22 (citing Exodus 23:2;
Deuteronomy 6:17-18; B[abylonian] Talmud, Baba Mezia 59b).
17. Moreover, when he does grapple with facts, Dow commits errors glaring enough
to make me suspicious of taking his empirical claims on faith alone. Two errors jumped
out at me. First, in the course of discussing the ideology of the Republican Party in 1860,
Dow refers to the "conservative" wing of the party, which he says was "(I]ed by Henry
Clay and Daniel Webster" (p. 133). Clay and Webster both died in 1852, two years before
the earliest date of the party's founding. Second, in dismissing Ackerman's conclusions
about the Thirty-Ninth Congress, Dow repeatedly refers to the elections of 1860. See pp.
133-34 & nn.69-70 (citing Ackerman, 93 Yale L.J. at 1065-68 (cited in note 9)). The
Thirty-Ninth Congress was constituted by the elections of 1864. It is ironic that these
errors appear under the heading "Structural Amendments and the (Ab)use of History"
(p. 131).
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make "transformative judicial appointments" (p. 83). As reconstituted by such appointments, the Supreme Court will write
"transformative opinions" that displace the existing constitutional order and therefore "operate . . . as the functional
equivalent of formal constitutional amendments" (p. 82).
According to Ackerman, such higher lawmaking has occurred twice in our history, the first occasion being the framing
and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. But wasn't that
Amendment adopted pursuant to the rules of Article V? No,
says Ackerman, the Reconstruction Republicans succeeded in
ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment only by "press[ing] the
rules of Article V beyond their breaking point" (p. 73). That is,
the Republicans cheated by obtaining ratifications from Southem legislatures by military coercion, and the Amendment is
therefore not valid according to the counting rules set forth in
the text of Article V. Admitting that this historical assertion is
debatable, Ackerman expects that "a large chunk of [his] forthcoming book ... will be required to establish this single conclusion" (p. 73). The second instance of higher lawmaking occurred
during the New Deal. This is the familiar story of the Supreme
Court's "switch in time" after the elections of 1936 and the
Court-packing proposal of 1937.
Ackerman would have us believe that his is an interpretive
theory (or, in Schauer's terminology, an intemalist analysis):
higher lawmaking is merely an alternative to "the monopolistic
[that is, exclusivist] interpretation of Article V" (p. 73). Don't
believe it. Ackerman simply assumes the conclusion-"The Article makes its procedures sufficient, but not necessary, for the
enactment of a valid constitutional amendment" (p. 72)-and
then attempts to justify that conclusion wholly apart from interpretive principles. Indeed, with one minor exception, Ackerman's theory rests solely on the social and political facts of
Reconstruction and the New Dea1.1s
18. The exception is his implicit (and transparently instrumental) premise that any
reading of Article V "delegitimizing the Fourteenth Amendment" is bad and should not
be adopted. The "monopolistic reading" of Article V does just this because, as explained
in the text, Ackerman believes that the Reconstruction Republicans who framed the
Fourteenth Amendment did not (at least in spirit) comply with the rules of Article V. See
pp. 72-73.
As Professor Tribe has recently observed, "Ackerman's willingness to embrace a
public discourse that would treat the Constitution as amendable by procedures nowhere
specified therein has led him to treat all constitutional text and structure as casually as he
treats Article V. What remains is barely recognizable as an interpretive undertaking at
all." Tribe, 108 Harv. L. Rev. at 1233 (cited in note 9) (second emphasis added). Tribe
was discussing Bruce Ackerman and David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 Harv.
L. Rev. 799 (1995), in which the authors judge the exclusivity of the treaty-making provi-
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If, for Schauer, the Grundnorm "is a matter of social fact,
and so determining it is for empirical investigation rather than
legal analysis" (p. 150), then Ackerman has followed Schauer's
prescription to the letter. The heart of Ackerman's argument is
his examination of "The Facts" of Reconstruction (pp. 74-77),
which he then organizes into "The Reconstructed Pattern" (pp.
77-79). When he turns to the twentieth century, Ackerman immediately describes "The New Deal Pattern" (pp. 80-81) and
considers, in factual terms, "What Was New about the New
Deal" (pp. 81-82). If Schauer is disposed to look for the
Grundnorm "in the practices of a citizenry, in the practices of its
officials, and in the practices of its judges" (p. 161), then so is
Ackerman. During Reconstruction in the nineteenth century,
various "officials" (the Republican Congress and President Johnson, respectively) sought to implement competing constitutional
visions, the "citizenry" (the electorate of 1866) awarded a decisive electoral victory to one set of competitors, and the victors
(Congress) successfully forced the defeated (the President) to acquiesce in practice (pp. 78-79). In our own century, this pattern
was repeated during the New Deal-with the additional nuance
that "judges" (the Supreme Court as reconstituted by transformative appointments) actively participated in implementing the
new order (pp. 81-82).
In short, Ackerman has given us a historical account of
changes in the United States Grundnorm-but no more. Besides, the Reconstruction half of his account seems unnecessary:
the very great changes to our ultimate legal norms during that
era occurred not just as a matter of social fact but also as a matter of very positive law, namely, the text of our Constitution.
(Ackerman deserves, I suppose, the chance to prove otherwise,
but his present essay does not attempt such proof; we must wait
for his promised book.) So only the New Deal remains as an
example of Ackerman's extra-textual higher lawmaking. Ultimately, then, Ackerman's theory reduces to Griffin's statement
that "all significant change in the structure of the national gov-

sions of Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 solely by reference to a series of political events
that took place in the 1940's.
I cannot help thinking that Ackennan has failed to heed his own counsel that "if the
interpretivist is serious about interpretation, he cannot refuse to read a text simply because he finds its message inconvenient." Ackerman, 93 Yale L.J. at 1070 (cited in note
9). In describing the theory of higher lawmaking as an alternative "reading" of Article V,
Ackennan is "playing so fast and loose with the traditional disciplines of legal interpretation as to make the entire notion of interpretation seem utterly fraudulent." Id.
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ernment after the New Deal occurred through non-Article V
means" (p. 51).19
IV

This brings us to Akhil Amar's discussion of "Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional Amendment." Amar advances the
thesis that the American People "have a legal right to alter our
government-to amend our Constitution-via a majoritarian
and populist mechanism akin to a national referendum, even
though that mechanism is not explicitly specified in Article V"
(p. 89). The key word for our purposes is legal. If, by this word,
Amar had referred to natural law, so as to argue that we have a
natural right to reconstitute our polity without resort to Article
V, it would be difficult for me to quarrel with him. But I read
Amar to refer to the Constitution itself, so as to argue that we
have a constitutional right to amend our Constitution outside Article V. This meaning of legal is evident, for example, in Amar's
positing "two plausible interpretations of Article V": (1) the
"conventional" exclusivist reading, and (2) "an alternative reading that it enumerates the only mode(s) by which ordinary government [as opposed to the People] may amend the Constitution"
(p. 91). Moreover, Amar asserts that if he is correct, "we need to
seriously rethink much of constitutional law" (p. 108).
In my view, Amar does not prove this more ambitious claim
of a constitutional right of the People to amend the Constitution
outside of Article V's specified procedures. Indeed, his evidence
points in the opposite direction, indicating that the asserted right
of the People "to alter our government" by amending the Constitution is independent of, even superior to, any enumeration in
positive law, including the Constitution. In other words, it is a
natural right, not a constitutional one. I offer a very brief sketch
of the evidence. Consider first Amar's own formulation of the
simple "right" of majoritarian constitutional amendment. He
takes it not from the Constitution, but from the Declaration of
Independence: "WE hold these Truths to be self-evident ... ,
that whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of
these Ends [Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness], it is the
Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new
Government .... " Indeed, Amar uses this classic statement of
natural rights for his title-page quotation (p. 89).
19. Although Ackerman describes those means in succinct terms-the Supreme
Court now writes opinions that "operate ... as the functional equivalent of formal constitutional amendments" (p. 82)-this description simply states the obvious.
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Arnar's discussion of how the Framers viewed this right also
undercuts his thesis. At the Philadelphia convention, Madison
argued (in Arnar's words) that analogues to Article V in state
constitutions were "not best understood as depriving the People
of their preexisting legal right to alter or abolish [governments] at
will. For that preexisting right ... was one of the 'first principles'
of the legal order" (p. 97, emphasis added). But if Arnar is correct that this right of the People is a "preexisting" one-that is, a
right that preexists constitutions-then it is not a right granted by
constitutions. Furthermore, in The Federalist No. 39 (in a passage not discussed by Arnar), Madison appears to argue that the
Convention's own product should be understood differently-as
affirmatively taking away any preexisting rights held by mere
majorities:
[Article V is] neither wholly national nor wholly federal. Were
it wholly national, the supreme and ultimate authority would
reside in the majority of the people of the Union; and this authority would be competent at all times, like that of a majority
of every national society[,] to alter or abolish its established
govemment.20

Except for its first thirteen words, this passage essentially restates
Arnar's thesis. But of course, this restatement is purely hypothetical: it depends on a proposition-that Article V is "wholly
national"-the truth of which Madison has only just denied.
Madison's "first principles," or at least those principles he
expressed in the Philadelphia convention, were explicated at the
Pennsylvania ratifying convention by James Wilson (whom Amar
places highest in the pantheon of Framers):
The truth is, that in our governments, the supreme, absolute,
and uncontrollable power remains in the people. As our constitutions are superior to our legislatures, so the people are
superior to our constitutions. Indeed the superiority, in this
last instance, is much greater; for the people possess over our
constitution, control in act, as well as right.
The consequence is, the people may change the constitutions whenever and however they please. This is a right of
which no positive institution can ever deprive them.21

Wllson says that the right of the People to change constitutions is
not found in the constitutions but is superior to them. In addi20. Clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers 246 (Mentor, 1961).
21. P. 98 (quoting Jonathan Elliot, ed., 2 The Debates in the Several Slille Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 432 (1901)). The emphasis in the second
paragraph is Amar's.
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tion, no positive institution-a category that includes constitutions-can deprive the People of this right, for it is "supreme,
absolute, and uncontrollable." In other words, no written document can contain the right of revolution.22
If Amar has not shown that the People have a constitutional
right to amend the Constitution outside Article V, what has he
shown? Schauer can help here. Undoubtedly, Amar has described, in great detail, the Grundnorm that existed in American
society on the eve of the ratification of the Constitution of 1787.
Rooted in a self-conscious conception of the People as sovereign,
that Grundnorm was ready to embrace the destruction and creation of governments-the total or partial displacement of existing state constitutions and the framing of a national
constitution-when certain indicia of popular participation were
present. That is, if a legal norm were successfully submitted to a
majority vote of the People assembled in convention, it would
become social fact and would be accepted by citizenry, officials,
and judges. As Amar puts it, "the loyal opposition to the Constitution in 1787 fought the good fight in conventions and not on
battlefields. And when outvoted-often by simple majoritiesanti-Federalists in every state in the end accepted the outcome"
(pp. 92-93).
One might extend Amar's analysis to argue that the same
Grundnorm does (or should) hold today. Recall that according
to Dow, we believe that a majority yesterday can require us to
act by supermajority today (p. 122). Perhaps Amar thinks we
believe the opposite: if a majority of voters petition for a convention to propose changes in our Constitution, and if a simple majority ratifies the changes so proposed in a national referendum,
then such changes ("amendments") would be accepted as ultimate legal norms in our society. But on this score, Amar-like
Dow-provides no evidence. We simply do not know.

22. Conceivably, Amaris arguing merely that Article V does not purport to displace
the preexisting natural right of the People to amend the Constitution, even if Article V
does not affirmatively grant such a right. If so, I fail to discern the import of his efforts,
assuming they are successful If, as Wilson claims, "no positive institution can ever deprive" the People of their right to "change [their] constitutions whenever and however
they please," then it is simply irrelevant what Article V (or the rest of the Constitution)
does or does not say about that right A right that is "supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable" cannot be taken away by Article V; by the same token, such a right needs no (silent)
help from Article V either. In any case, even this more modest thesis would appear to
founder on Madison's statement in The Federalist No. 39. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
After all this, one might ask, what is the American
Grundnorm with respect to the constitutional amendment process? In perhaps the finest essay in Responding to Imperfection,
Donald Lutz posits that all political systems need periodic alteration, such that constitutions (or, to use Schauer's more precise
term Grundnorms) inevitably evolve over time, if not by formal
amendment then by interpretation (pp. 242-46). H, as Lutz argues, the United States Constitution is comparatively difficult to
amend by formal means and has thus been amended comparatively rarely by such means (p. 265), then it should be obvious
that our amending Grundnorm now accepts de facto amendment-by-interpretation as a matter of course. Indeed, as I noted
briefly at the beginning of this review, this point is the thrust of
Stephen Griffin's essay.
Perhaps our reluctance to change the text of the Constitution derives from a kind of quasi-religious reverence for the document-or at least what the document has come to symbolize.
(Consider our nation's almost paralyzing fear of a constitutional
convention, even though that mechanism for change is explicitly
authorized by Article V.) Is our amending Grundnorm consistent with the Constitution that we purport to revere? Ackerman
and Amar purport to give affirmative answers. In my view, Ackerman's theory of higher lawmaking (as applied to the twentieth
century at least) is correct as a descriptive matter, and Amar's
theory of majoritarian amendment is correct as a matter of natural law. Yet each theory depends on some value external to the
Constitution, and each is, at some level, inconsistent with the text
of Article V. (Yes, I am an exclusivist.) Even Dow, who superficially upholds this text, ultimately grounds his conclusions in
"what we believe," not in the Constitution. In short, none of the
supposedly "interpretive" theories reviewed here is sound as a
matter of constitutional interpretation: it is, after all, not a
Grundnorm we are expounding, but a Constitution.

